Unconsitutional Conditions and Bargaining Breakdown by Epstein, Richard A.
San Diego Law Review 
Volume 26 
Issue 2 Unconstitutional Conditions Symposium Article 3 
February 2019 
Unconsitutional Conditions and Bargaining Breakdown 
Richard A. Epstein 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard A. Epstein, Unconsitutional Conditions and Bargaining Breakdown, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 189 
(1989). 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol26/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, 




In this paper, I should like to consider again the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions, which I recently examined at far greater
length in my Foreword to the Harvard Law Review's Supreme Court
issue.' This article should not be regarded as a simple summary of
material that has been presented at far greater length elsewhere, for
with summary comes clarification, extension, reconsideration, qualifi-
cation, and defense. My ambition, therefore, is to move the analysis
further in two directions, one theoretical and one practical. My first
goal is to show how the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions can
operate as an effective barrier against the dissipation of the social
gains that are otherwise obtainable by collective social action. The
second goal is to show how the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions, notwithstanding its nineteenth century origins, continues to
play an important intellectual role in modern constitutional theory.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the first section of this
paper, I shall state the dilemma which gives rise to the problem of
unconstitutional conditions. In the second section, I shall make ex-
plicit the linkage between the problem of unconstitutional conditions
and the model of the "Two Pies" that I have developed at length in
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chi-
cago. These remarks were originally prepared for the Panel on Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, held at the annual convention of the American Association of Law Schools in New
Orleans on January 6, 1989.
1. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits
of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988) [hereinafter Epstein, Foreword]. Interest in the
subject continues to be high. In addition to the other papers in this issue, see Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). At present I have plans to
expand my Foreword into a book, tentatively entitled, Bargaining with the State.
my Takings book.2 In it, I show how the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine performs a useful social function even in situations where
the Pareto conditions have been met.3 In the third section, I give five
separate numerical examples in order to isolate the types of condi-
tions that raise special questions of unconstitutional conditions, as
opposed to ordinary takings problems or, indeed, no constitutional
problems at all. The fourth and final section examines the necessary
role for the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions both before and
after the constitutional watershed of 1937.1 In that section, I explain
why the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions will be a necessary
part of constitutional law so long as there are two spheres of govern-
ment action - one in which there is a presumption in favor of gov-
ernment power, and a second in which there is the opposite presump-
tion in favor of individual liberties. The doctrine arises as an effort to
determine the constitutionality of government action which touches
upon these two separate realms simultaneously. The exact demarca-
tions between these two domains only tells where the doctrine will
surface. But so long as the two domains do coexist, as they must, the
doctrine will continue to have as much vitality in the present regula-
tory environment as it did in the pre-1937 era.
I. WHY UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS: THE ALLURE OF THE
GREATER/LESSER POWER
Unconstitutional conditions raise one of the few pervasive
problems of constitutional law that threads its way through a large
number of unrelated substantive areas. The initial query with uncon-
stitutional conditions is disarmingly simple. Why have the doctrine
at all? In the usual case, the state is in a position to offer or withhold
some benefit to an individual; likewise, that person may accept or
reject the benefit at will. The state is under no obligation to supply
the benefit in the first instance, so the state is not welching on its
obligations by unilaterally imposing new conditions on preexisting
arrangements.
2. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DO-
MAIN 3-6 (1985) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS].
3. Situations where the Pareto conditions are met are those in which someone is
made better off and no one is made worse off. See, on the various definitions of social
welfare, Coleman, Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the Foundations of the
Economic Approach to Law, 94 ETHICS 649 (1984).
4. The 1937 revolution had two sides. The first side concerned the expansion of
the commerce clause, on which see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I
(1937), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The second side concerned the
limitation of the protection of economic liberties, on which see West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). There has been widespread approval of both these trends.
For my lonely dissent from the current consensus, see Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11
GEO. MASON UNIV. L. REV. 5 (1988).
[VOL. 26: 189, 1989] Bargaining Breakdown
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
These two at-will extremes create an extensive bargaining range
between the state and the individual. Within that range, the bar-
gains struck should leave both sides better off than before. To use
simple numbers, if the state valued "its" holdings at fifty and the
individual valued his or hers at thirty, then any agreement between
the two which yielded a total value in excess of eighty could be
structured to leave both sides better off than before. The resources
would be placed where valued most and appropriate cash transfers
then made to divide the benefits, such that the state has holdings in
excess of fifty and the individual has holdings in excess of thirty. So
long as each side has complete power to decide whether to take or
leave any conditioned benefit, who should be able to complain?
In the classical economic sense, the new order appears to be
Pareto superior to the old, and hence desirable under the standard
accounts of social welfare. The untrammeled power to refuse to give
consent is protection enough for both the state and the citizen. The
greater power to stay out of the deal altogether gives rise to the
lesser power to enter into it only if certain conditions are met. Con-
sent, or waiver, thus become the universal solvent that cuts across
the various constitutional provisions that protect individual rights.
There is good reason for the ubiquitous nature of the greater/lesser
argument - and for the unconstitutional conditions riposte.
The model of bargaining adopted here has great staying power
because it organizes most of our understanding of ordinary private
transactions. For example, the ordinary purchase of a piece of land is
reached by bargaining under the greater/lesser logic. If the prospec-
tive buyer is willing to pay $100 for the land, he is not obliged to
make an initial offer of that amount. Any lesser sum will do, for the
greater power not to do business with the landowner encompasses
the lesser power to bid any amount, however small. The owner, in
turn, protects himself by holding out for a higher price, until a deal
is struck. To deny the greater/lesser paradigm its syllogistic force in
this context is to set commerce adrift at sea without paddle or rud-
der. Quite simply, there is no alternative mechanism for any volun-
tary exchange. The greater/lesser argument is thus the precondition
for commerce and trade and has been so in all stages of our nation's
history. It is not an easy target to undermine. So, why should one
abandon it in trying to think about the bargains and grants that the
state can make with its citizens?
II. THE PARETO TRAP AND THE Two PIES
There is no simple answer to the challenge posed by the trap -
the Pareto trap - of the greater/lesser argument. I believe that the
right way to go about the job is to identify reasons that render this
simple, freedom of contract model inadequate in private transac-
tions, and then to identify how those same circumstances arise in the
public sphere with the state exercise of power.
In order to see this point, it is useful to revert to a very simple
model I used to analyze the operation of the takings clause of the
Constitution.5 It is the model of the Two Pies. The inner circle con-
tains a set of individual entitlements, where the allocation of an indi-
vidual's shares is well-defined within the legal system. For these pur-
poses it does not matter how that inner circle is defined. It only
matters that rights are definite, and that there is general agreement
as to who has what, before the government moves into action. Any
baseline will do, whether it is based on the common law rights or
welfare state entitlements.
The question then arising is: How can the various parties in the
initial position improve their original position? With the takings
clause, the emphasis is on improving each position through coercive
action rendered necessary to overcome the coordination and holdout
problems that might arise when large numbers of individuals have to
unanimously agree in order to change the status quo ante." Within
the Pareto social welfare standard, the only query is whether each
person has some slice of the outer ring (in which case the ring itself
is necessarily positive). That condition is satisfied when trades are
voluntary, given ordinary individual self-interest. There is no reason
to worry about the allocation of gain to decide whether the bargain,
conditional or not, is socially desirable. The test only requires that it
be shown that no one is worse off after the bargain than before, and
that at least one person is better off by virtue of that bargain. In
practice, both parties will be made better off; otherwise, the bargain
will not take place. The total size and distribution of the gain have
no place in the traditional austere analysis.
Why not settle for this state of affairs, where the size of the outer
ring is positive, and each person bears some fraction of the gain,
without imposing any constraints on the distribution of the gain so
generated? The usual argument favoring this position is that our in-
ability to make interpersonal comparisons of utility also blocks any
effort to decide who should receive a larger, and who a smaller,
share of the social surplus from cooperative action. In the context of
5. See supra note 2.
6. See generally M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
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two-person private contracts, there is a great force to this argument,
especially when competitive forces channel voluntary agreements
into contracts with unique, or near unique, price terms. The surplus
will pretty much take care of itself, for if one transaction does not
exhaust all possible gains, then others will follow, Therefore, the
trick is to reduce the transaction costs, allowing the desirable conse-
quences to follow of their own accord, in yet another application of
the Coase theorem. 7
This conclusion, however, is not universal because, often times,
bargaining problems in the private sphere are large enough to over-
whelm the potential gains from voluntary transactions. Two
problems come to the fore: monopoly and prisoner's dilemma games.
A. Monopoly
In many contexts the state does not bargain in a competitive mar-
ket, where the distribution of surplus is constrained by the threat
that citizens may go elsewhere. Max Weber defined the state as that
organized group of individuals that exercises a permanent monopoly
of force within a given territory.' This definition itself guarantees
that the state has a monopoly on an important resource, so that the
nature of the bargained solution is not uniquely determined by the
existence of a substantial number of viable alternatives available to
private citizens.
Where that monopoly situation exists at common law, the laissez-
faire attitude toward private bargains no longer survives. The para-
digm "private necessity" case arises where the owner of the dock can
exclude the owner of a ship whose life and property are threatened
by a storm.9 The scope of the bargaining range here is very large,
even when the dockowner does not resort to either force or fraud.
Perhaps he is the soul of candor, and says: "I shall make you better
off by saving your life if you agree to pay me some exorbitant sum."
Even where the money is paid over, common longstanding law rules
7. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcON. 1 (1960). The now cele-
brated theorem says that where transaction costs are zero, resource allocation will be
unaffected by the original assignments of entitlement. Conversely where transaction costs
are positive, the original assignment of rights will influence resource allocation by block-
ing any movement of resources to higher valued use, or by increasing the costs of making
the necessary adjustment in rights structures through contract.
8. M. WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOL-
OGY 77 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. trans. 1946).
9. See Vincent v. Lake Erie .Transp. Corp., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221
(1910), discussed in Epstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 18.
have allowed the shipowner to set aside the contract and recover the
excess, if any, previously paid over. The dockowner is limited to the
rental value of his dock and recovery for any damage inflicted by the
unwanted entrant.
The justification for this interference with freedom of contract is
to introduce new property rights regimes that will enhance the size
of the cooperative surplus, by restraining the opportunistic behavior
possible when overt necessity creates a huge bargaining range that
one party, the dockholder, is in a position to exploit. The scope of the
bargaining range has more than distributional consequences. It will
shrink the size of the total gain from rescue, as the parties expend
resources and jockey to appropriate the larger share of the surplus.
The dangers are well appreciated at an intuitive level, for there is a
wealth of private transactions in which parties, who anticipate
holdout situations, try to bargain in advance for ways to resolve
those difficulties before dramatic confrontations arise. Complex
agreements governing salvage at sea are one notable example."0 The
agreements governing condominiums and cooperatives are another.'"
However, antecedent voluntary contracts are not available in neces-
sity cases between strangers, so the law must supply the needed
terms. The best guess, and it is a good guess, is that these are the
kinds of agreements that all persons would subjectively find in their
interest if they had been in a position to make them.
In this environment, the imposition of the forced exchange is not
an effort to override individual subjective preferences by some inde-
pendent or higher social determination of the good. It is an attempt
to honor those preferences in a world in which high transaction costs
prohibit their realization through private transactions. It is a perilous
undertaking, but there is no way to avoid it, for we cannot assume
some "safe" alternative whereby doing nothing better preserves the
autonomy of individuals. When voluntary deals are blocked, nonac-
tion could be as destructive as misguided action. Minimizing the va-
rious threats to autonomy requires us to control against two types of
error, that of not making needed bargains as well as that of making
unneeded ones, is all that can be done. It cannot be assumed that
standing pat honors the subjective preferences of the participants,
especially in life and death situations.
In dealing with constitutional issues we often face, if less starkly,
the same type of monopoly situation. The state, for example, has
exclusive ownership of its highways. There is a bilateral monopoly
between the state and any of its citizens. We cannot assume that
10. See Brough, Liability Salvage - Private Ordering, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
(forthcoming).
11. See Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906 (1988).
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there will be a unique bargaining outcome, and there is a risk that
valuable resources will be lost in the process of negotiating the terms
and conditions by which any person is allowed access of public roads.
Freedom of contract in the private area is limited when the risk of
strategic bargaining threatens to consume surplus. The same risk is
present in the highway example. The federal government can place
an "Hammer lock" over all forms of interstate travel. 2 The doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions is the counterweight to bargaining
breakdown in the public sphere."3
It is not possible in this short space to detail, across the board,
how these doctrinal efforts to control monopoly power play them-
selves out. But it is possible to mention three monopoly type situa-
tions in which the doctrine has been invoked, with varying success, in
order to limit the power of the government to dissipate the coopera-
tive surplus from its contracts.
In the foreign incorporation cases' 4 the doctrine was used to tell
states that, while they could exclude foreign corporations from doing
business within the jurisdiction altogether, they could not admit
them subject to discriminatory taxes and regulations. Here the state
monopoly power lies in its ability to admit foreign corporations. For
example, there may be a competitive market for charters of national
corporations between New Jersey and Delaware. But, there is only
one state which can allow a Delaware corporation into New York,
and that is New York. Its monopoly power is absolute within this
limited sphere.
12. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), discussed in Epstein, Fore-
word, supra note 1, at 40-44. The statute invalidated in Hammer required a firm to
comply with the federal child labor statute in all its operations in order to ship any of its
goods in interstate commerce. The "Hammer lock" refers to the powerful constraint that
this statute places on local operations of the firm in an era where direct regulation of
local manufacturing was forbidden to the federal government. With the revolution of
1937, the vexing unconstitutional conditions aspect of Hammer disappears under the re-
morseless scope of the affirmative commerce power.
13. A variation of the doctrine applies in connection with coercion. Thus suppose
that A takes from B's property, and then offers to sell it back for $100. The subsequent
transaction viewed in isolation leaves B better off than he was before, so long as he values
the thing more than $100. Nonetheless, that second bargain is suspect because it in-
creases the likelihood of the original taking. The situation here involves the common law
cases of "duress of goods" because the prior theft vitiates the latter transaction. This
theme also appears in the unconstitutional conditions cases in which the government first
takes by taxation and then seeks to impose conditions on repayment. For illustrations of
this problem, see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
14. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910), discussed in
Epstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 31-38.
A second illustration involves federal efforts to gain control over
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce before 1937, when man-
ufacture was regulated only locally within each state.' The balance
of state and federal power could have been undone if the federal
government had used its monopoly power to exclude goods from in-
terstate commerce in order to obtain control over matters, which,
according to the original understanding of the Constitution had been
reserved to the exclusive domain of the states.'6 Again, the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions was invoked to limit the scope of fed-
eral power. 17
A third illustration involves local use of the highways.' If a given
state allowed persons to use the highway only if they allowed them-
selves to be regulated as common carriers, it could, in effect, remove
and control the entire private side of the competitive market. Here,
too, there is a huge bargaining range between the terms which they
can obtain with and without regulation. Again, the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions was initially invoked in order to restrict the
scope of the bargaining range in this bilateral monopoly situation,
with very little ultimate success.' 9
In each of these cases there are two separate inquiries. The first is
the question of whether the circumstances of the case "trigger" the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. So long as we can find the
existence of monopoly power, that question is typically answered in
the affirmative. Nonetheless, the presence of monopoly power stand-
ing alone is not sufficient to vitiate the consent given to the govern-
ment's condition. There is still the further question of "justification"
- which must be answered by asking whether the condition in ques-
tion is designed to skew the distribution of cooperative surplus in
favor of one given side or another.
15. See, e.g., The Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922), discussed in Ep-
stein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 40-44.
16. For my views, see Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA.
L. REV. 1387 (1987).
17. Epstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 40-47.
18. See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
19. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Binion, 287 U.S. 251 (1932). This case allowed regula-
tion of private carriers, notwithstanding the earlier decision in Frost, because the appli-
cable "Texas statute in respect of permits deals exclusively with the private contract
carrier, and requires the issue of the permit not to him in the imposed character of a
common carrier, but in his actual character as a private contract carrier." Id. at 267-68.
In other words, the great purposes of Frost were evaded by two statutes instead of one,
as the earlier decision intimated. See Epstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 52 (which
noted the fatal weaknesses of Frost, but which did not refer to Stephenson). I want to
thank Kathleen Sullivan for supplying me with the necessary Stephenson reference. Note
that Stephenson is a Lochner era case that is far more consistent with the post-1937
deference on economic matters.
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B. Prisoner's Dilemma Games
A second variation of this bargaining breakdown theme arises
when the state is pitted against large numbers of separate and unco-
ordinated individuals. In essence, the situation could well be that of
the classical prisoner's dilemma game; each party makes private de-
cisions leading to an ultimate outcome that none of them desires. In
the classical game, for example, each of two separate prisoners con-
fesses to the crime even though it is in the interest of each to remain
silent, so long as he is assured that the other remains silent as well.
When that bond of assurance is broken, each person has the incen-
tive to defect from their preferred joint strategy by confessing. Put
simply, if the other fellow does not defect, then confession allows me
to improve my situation handsomely. If the other fellow does confess,
then I have to confess as well to prevent ruinous losses. One domi-
nant, self-interested strategy applies regardless of what the other
party does, so we each end up worse off without cooperation than we
could have been with it.
A similar situation could arise when the use of government power
is directed against many separate and uncoordinated individuals. In-
deed the specter of this situation animated the extension of the un-
constitutional conditions principle in highway cases.20 For example,
it may well be that each person regards his right to participate in
political affairs to be of little consequence. Therefore, if told that he
must waive his constitutional rights to freedom of speech in order to
use the highways, he might think himself better off for the choice,
regardless of whether other individuals waived their free speech
rights as well. Nonetheless, all people prefer to have a social order in
which speech is not compromised, but protected. If, therefore, the
state - or its key officials - faced a unified coalition of the citi-
zenry when it set up the same choice, it would collectively be re-
jected out of hand. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, by
precluding the waiver of free speech rights as the price for using the
highways, prevents government officials from adopting the strategy
of divide and conquer (a strategy appropriate to prisoners, but not to
citizens). When the state acts in this manner, consent of the citizen
to the condition should not protect the statute.
20. "If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condi-
tion of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that
guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated
out of existence." Frost, 271 U.S. at 594. Justice Sutherland's instincts are correct but
he offers no explanation as to how the strategy could be successful.
The apparent logic that all (two-party) contracts are Pareto supe-
rior between the parties ignores the systematic consequences charac-
teristic of the prisoner's dilemma game. Yet it was the risk of this
degenerative social situation that led, if only implicitly, to the adop-
tion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. But, as cases like
Frost indicate, it is far more likely for these destructive social strate-
gies to succeed in economic areas than in political areas. There is too
much organized political resistance to a proposal which says "People
may use the public highway only if they vote Republican (or Demo-
cratic)." (The skeptic might say the only reason they are not tried is
that it is clear that they would be struck down.) But, there are surely
intermediate cases that require closer attention, such as the demand
that persons who use the highways submit to random types of
searches and seizures.
III. PRESERVING THE GAINS FROM COLLECTIVE ACTION
The above cases, then, set the basic framework for analysis. The
overall situation can be better understood, I believe, by giving nu-
merical illustrations of the variations that have to be distinguished in
the unconstitutional conditions context. Assume for simplicity that
there are two groups with identical initial endowments. The govern-
ment could then exercise its coercive power to introduce any one of
the following new states of affairs. How should each of these scena-
rios be treated under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions?
Scenario I: No Conditions
Group A Group B
(a) Before regulation 100 100
(b) With regulation 150 150
Scenario II: Virtuous conditions
Group A Group B
(a) Before regulation 100 100
(b) With regulation 150 150
(c) With regulation and good condition 160 160
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Scenario III: Oppressive conditions 
Group A Group B 
(a) Before regulation 100 100 
(b) After regulation 150 150 
(c) Pareto failure 160 90 
Scenario IV: Unconstitutional conditions 
Group A Group B 
(a) Before regulation 100 100 
(b) With regulation 150 150 
(c) With regulation and bad condition 160 130 
Scenario V. Problematic conditions 
Group A Group B 
(a) Before regulation 100 100 
(b) With regulation 150 150 
(c) With regulation and problematic 
condition 170 160 
Where we can find that the state has monopoly power, each of the 
above five situations requires a somewhat different analysis. The first 
scenario is relatively straightforward. Both sides to the transaction 
advance equally, so there is an improvement all around. Moreover, 
so long as the parties remain in lockstep there are powerful reasons 
to believe that the total size of the gain will be maximized. Hence 
the disproportionate impact test, 21 which this case so clearly invokes, 
has the desirable effect of insuring not only that people are left as 
well . off as they were before, but also that they move to the highest 
possible state of welfare, even without a direct judicial determination 
of
what actions produce that result. The procedural constraint gives 
the right incentive for the substantive result. There is no problem of 
TA 21. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U .S . 40 (1960), discussed in EPSTEIN, 
TAKINGS, Supra note 2, a t 42 -44 . 
199 
unconstitutional action or of unconstitutional conditions in this
setting.
The second scenario indicates a virtuous condition. Here, we can
assume that the gains achievable under Scenario I, without the use
of any conditions (i.e., the roads are built and everyone may use
them) are not altered as the state imposes conditions (i.e., a speed
limit or a requirement of service of process). These limitations both
help and hurt members of both groups, but for each they help more
than they hurt (the highways are safer for everyone). There is there-
fore a further gain off of both (a) and (b) baselines, and the case is
again nonproblematic. The mutual gain assured by the state's condi-
tion is the justification legitimating the use of monopoly power.
The third scenario leaves the individuals in group B worse off after
government action than before it. There is no need for a doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions to handle this case because no member of
group B would ever voluntarily consent to situation (c), given that he
is worse off than in situation (a). Therefore, the unconstitutional
conditions issue will not arise. The case here does not concern the
distribution of cooperative surplus, but rather the simpler question of
whether members of group B can claim that they have not received
just compensation for their property that has been taken. The case
therefore is amenable to invalidation under an ordinary takings anal-
ysis, without ever reaching any concern about the size or distribution
of the cooperative surplus.
The fourth scenario illustrates where the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions takes grip. There is no question that the final state
of affairs is Pareto superior to the initial state of affairs. Hence if the
question is whether we have this deal, (c), or no deal, (a), individuals
in both groups will accept the deal. Nonetheless, there is both less of
an aggregate increase than there was in the regulation without the
condition, as in (a), and a skewing of the benefits to group A. The
two phenomena are closely related. The doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions therefore restricts the alternatives available to the state
(i.e., dominant group A) to a choice between the initial unregulated
situation and the unconditioned legislation. Now the state will
choose the latter given that its own interests are thereby advanced.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions thus operates to good so-
cial purpose when there is a Pareto improvement over the initial
state of affairs. This is the paradigmatic case where the greater/
lesser power arguments lose their normative force.
The fifth scenario is one in which a condition is imposed which
improves matters still further than the unconditional action, but
spreads the gain unequally between the individual and the state. In a
sense the condition is virtuous because it improves welfare on both
sides, but the want of equality in advancement leaves one uneasy
[VOL 26: 189, 1989] Bargaining Breakdown
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(for in practice it may be difficult to distinguish this case from Sce-
nario III). Here, the hardest question is whether it is worthwhile to
take steps to equalize the gain. One possibility is to leave well
enough alone, which is surely the right answer if the costs of equali-
zation are greater than ten, because the full gain between (b) and
(c) would be dissipated. On the other hand, if equalization (redistri-
bution) was costless, then it would be called for, because neither side
should get an advantage that the other is denied. But the case here is
a weak one, if only because the equalization transfer produces no
overall resource gain or loss. Finally, if the equalization costs are
greater than zero but less than ten, there is a problem of whether
equity in distribution is worth the shrinkage of the overall pie - a
very hard question on which it is not possible to give a principled
answer. Happily, situations of this sort present an abundance of
riches and are far less critical than cases like those found in Scenario
IV.
The hard task is to decide which substantive conditions encoun-
tered in practice move us to Scenario II and which to Scenario IV. I
have already indicated that the incorporation cases involving dis-
criminatory taxation fall within Scenario IV because the gain itself
is unequal. Also, there is reason to fear that some portion of the
cooperative surplus in those cases will be competed away by political
action. 2 The same conclusion is quite clearly the case if the scheme
in Frost could go forward, as is today the case.23 -Today, there is a
manifest departure from the competitive equilibrium which gives an
unprincipled advantage to the common carriers. In contrast, the ser-
vice of process and speed limit cases seem to be relatively straight-
forward illustrations of Scenario II, for there seems to be no dispa-
rate impact lurking behind the formal inequality. Therefore, the
basic system, as applied to economic liberties, worked to achieve the
ideal of any sound system of collective action: to maximize the total
amount of gain achieved by government action. The consent require-
ment protects individuals from being left worse off than they were
before government action, that is, it rules out Scenario III. Nonethe-
less, it does not rule out Scenario IV, which the doctrine of unconsti-
tutional conditions attacks.
22. See, e.g., McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic
Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987).
23. See supra note 19.
IV. THE MODERN APPLICATION OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
Thus far, this brief analysis has concentrated on the early uncon-
stitutional conditions cases where the Court had some willingness to
protect economic liberties and to insure that government provision of
a monopoly good was not seized upon to distort competitive equilib-
ria.24 However, it should not be supposed that the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions functions only in that kind of setting; although
that assumption could easily be made, since, as a matter of first prin-
ciple, I believe in both the strong protection of economic liberties
and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Nonetheless, the two is-
sues are severable. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has an
important place even in the modern constitutional era.
Historically, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions broke its
teeth in exactly those areas where common law rules were displaced
by government regulation, long before the 1937 constitutional water-
shed. The common law did not treat corporations as though they
were natural persons.2 Its basic rules of property, contract, and tort
did allow individuals to form voluntary associations for common bus-
iness purposes, but these were in the nature of partnerships. No vol-
untary contract among shareholders could limit the liability of that
partnership, or its members, to strangers. Yet it was just that limita-
tion on third party rights that is brought about by the familiar cor-
porate doctrine of limited liability.26 Therefore, corporations must
turn to state corporate charters to escape the clutches of common
law limitations making them "artificial beings" subject to extensive
state regulation.2 7 It was precisely to combat the dangers of allowing
local companies to do business at low tax rates while subjecting for-
eign corporations to higher ones that the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions was created.2 8 Similarly, even during the so-called Loch-
ner era, state regulation of public utilities was routinely accepted.29
The Interstate Commerce Act introduced the first system of rate
regulation, which limited the railroads' common law rights to charge
whatever rates they saw fit.30 Similarly, the original ratemaking
24. See Epstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 50-51.
25. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
26. See generally Note, The Personification of the Business Corporation in Amer-
ican Law, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 1441 (1988).
27. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819) (Marshall, C.J., uses the phrase in his opinion), discusssed in Epstein, Foreword,
supra note 1, at 28-31.
28. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910), discussed in
Epstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 34-35.
29. See Smythe v. Ames, 169 U.S. 469 (1898).
30. See Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
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rules were first developed in the last part of the nineteenth century,
before the Lochner decision itself.31 Rate regulation was also an inte-
gral and unchallenged part of the story in Frost. There the question
was how regulation of highway transport could be meshed with the
right to commence a lawful business, a right protected both at com-
mon law and under the Constitution.3 2 The unconstitutional condi-
tions question arose because it was settled (wrongly, I believe) that
the state, as the owner of "its" highways, had the right to exclude
ordinary people from their use altogether.3 3 The unconstitutional
conditions doctrine emerged precisely because government regulation
was a permanent feature of American life. The hard issue it ad-
dressed was: How to marry a system of government discretion (the
state may keep you off the roads altogether) with a system of pro-
tected individual rights, of which economic liberties were an
exemplar?
After 1937, economic liberties have received only scanty constitu-
tional protection. But, new forms of constitutional protections were
devised, with the doctrinal elaboration of preferred freedoms, funda-
mental rights, and suspect classifications. 4 These major doctrinal
changes have served to redirect the focus of the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine.
Two points bear special notice. First, the refusal to protect eco-
nomic liberties after 1937 repudiates the proposition that in eco-
nomic affairs ordinary people are the best judges of what bargains
are in their mutual interest. Consent may be displaced because of a
general belief in "the inequality of bargaining power."3 It may no
longer be overridden solely for cause, that is, in order to counter the
perverse consequences of bilateral monopoly or prisoner dilemma
problems. Quite the contrary, those problems dominate only in a
world where individuals are rational agents, who do know their own
welfare, and who can act strategically to advance it. Relax the as-
sumption of individual rationality, as the post-1937 Court does, and
we no longer face any puzzle in setting aside voluntary bargains,
because we no longer view those bargains as Pareto superior. In-
stead, they are regarded as exploitive, presumably because they leave
31. See, e.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), partially revived in Duquesne
Light Co. v. Barasch, 109 S. Ct. 609 (1989).
32. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
33. See Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925).
34. The genesis of this development dates to Carolene Prods. v. United States, 304
U.S. 144 (1938).
35. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
one side (workers, consumers, or whoever) systematically worse off
than they were before.3 6 Judged by their consequences, these exploi-
tive bargains are indistinguishable from ordinary cases of theft, in
that both types of cases involve practices whereby one side gains
while the other side loses. Given the costs of undertaking theft, and
of guarding against it, the exploiters systematically gain less than
their victims lose.37 Therefore, these transactions are unacceptable
even under the more relaxed Kaldor-Hicks standard of efficiency. 38
Exploitive bargains fare no better. If we reject the assumptions of
individual rationality, then the greater/lesser power proposition no
longer has any presumptive intellectual force. Bargains themselves
are not the greater, so conditional bargains are not the lesser. The
search for limited exceptions to freedom of contract, such as the bi-
lateral monopoly case, may be abandoned as unnecessary. Assume
exploitation, and "consensual" transactions look exactly like coerced
ones. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine drops out of the pic-
ture because consent is no longer regarded as sufficient protection
against government oppression.
The second consequence of the 1937 transformation has to do with
the political legitimation of all forms of the wealth redistribution.39
The full protection of economic liberties provided that rights to con-
tract, for example, could be taken from individuals only if they were
provided with a full equivalent in exchange. Forced exchanges were
allowed to intrude upon the sphere of individual autonomy, but re-
distribution across the board was not. After the 1937 demise, persons
could be made worse off, through regulation and restriction, and
have no constitutional complaint."° If persons are not protected
against partial confiscation, then it becomes quite impossible to see
why they should be entitled to any portion of the cooperative surplus
of government action. Stated otherwise, if Scenario III is a perfectly
acceptable outcome of regulation, then how can group B complain if
36. The locus classicus is still Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts
about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
37. See Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopoly and Theft, 5 W. EcoN.
J. 224 (1967).
38. This standard holds that state of the world 2 is preferable to state I if the
winners in state 2 could pay compensation to the losers in state 1 and still come out
ahead. The test requires only hypothetical compensation, not actual transfers, but like
the more demanding Pareto formulas it uses subjective standards of utility. If in state 1,
A has 100 and B has 50, then state 2 is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if B has 200 and A has 90
so long as B can make a transfer (here of more than 10 units) which would leave both
sides better off than they were in state 1. For an account of the test, see Coleman, supra
note 3.
39. Note, historically the constitutionality of welfare was settled long before the
1937 transformation, but other prohibitions against redistribution (represented by such
cases as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908); and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)) did hold until overrun.
40. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
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they are left in Scenario IV instead of Scenario II? Unless there is a
willingness to protect group B's original endowments, given at level
(a), then there can be no question of protecting B's higher level of
endowments at level (b). Therefore, there is no reason to protect
each person's share of the outer ring if they are entitled to no protec-
tion of their share of the inner pie.41 Again, the unconstitutional con-
ditions just drop out of the picture.
Nonetheless, the structure of the unconstitutional conditions prob-
lem, set out above, continues to apply with full force in modern set-
tings as illustrated by the preferred freedoms that came to the fore
after the demise of Lochner. Indeed, the vast increase in the number
of unconstitutional conditions cases in the post-Lochner period sug-
gests that no one today perceives either the problem, or the doctrine,
as an anachronism. To the contrary, the post-1937 increase in scope
of government activities has given it ever broader sway. But, not in
all cases. The key point is that the doctrine will take grip only where
the following two conditions are conjoined: (1) There must be an
area of activity in which government discretion is the norm; and (2)juxtaposed against the first condition, there must be some enclave of
protected individual rights. The problem of unconstitutional condi-
tions arises at the troubled intersection of these two disparate consti-
tutional regimes. Alternatively, when there are two areas with no
protected rights, the problem cannot arise. Without some conception
of vested rights, there is nothing for the doctrine to protect. That
was, I believe, the situation in Lyng v. International Union, UA W,42
given that there is neither a constitutional right to food stamps nor
one to collective bargaining. Similarly, the doctrine cannot be ap-
plied when too many constitutional rights are inconsistent with each
other. That was the case in Harris v. McRae,43 when the right to an
abortion and to free exercise of religion were in irreconcilable ten-
sion with each other. Applying the doctrine to protect one right
(abortion) necessarily infringes on the other right (religion). Like-
wise, inconsistent rights account for the difficulty in applying the
doctrine in Sherbert v. Verner' where a free exercise claim is in
evident conflict with an opposing establishment argument.
In light of the above analysis, we should see the greatest applica-
41. Assuming that one exists because the transfer is one which would have been
made even if compensation had been required.
42. 485 U.S. 360 (1988), discussed in Epstein, Forward, supra note 1, at 4-6, 97-
102.
43. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
44. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
tion of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions when individual
rights of speech and religion work at crosscurrents with general eco-
nomic issues. Cases like Speiser v. Randall , 5 Bob Jones University
v. United States,46 and United States v. Lee47 illustrate the collision
course between a relaxed judicial attitude toward economic regula-
tion, in the area of taxation, and a closer level of scrutiny of the
regulation of speech and religion. In Speiser, the Court held that a
real estate tax exemption could not be conditioned upon a willingness
to sign loyalty oaths. In Bob Jones, the Court inexplicably held
that government could condition its charitable exemption on the will-
ingness of a religious organization to abide by antidiscrimination
laws, even where compliance with the law required people to violate
their sincerely held religious beliefs.49 In Lee, the Court inexcusably
allowed the state to force the Amish to contribute to a social security
system from which they refused to collect benefits, even though they
regarded participation in the program as a sin.50
Even pure property cases, like Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission,51 fall into the same category. In Nollan, the state's lateral
easement, being possessory, was accorded powerful eminent domain
protection, while the right to develop privately-owned land was gov-
erned by the far less exacting rational basis test under the police
power. 52 The question that the Court had to face, in this situation,
was whether the government could structure its bargains with cer-
tain citizens such that it could require individuals to sacrifice an
easement to the state in order to obtain the needed building permits.
The consequence of the condition is to reduce the gain that the af-
fected property owners receive relative to that which other individu-
als, not saddled by the same conditions, may obtain.
The five scenarios, set out above, thus apply with equal force to
each of these cases. It is only necessary that we make the modest
assumption that individuals who are forced to take benefits, subject
to unwanted conditions, experience some diminution in their utility,
regardless of the nature of the condition (e.g., economic, speech, reli-
gious) that is imposed.
These cases are best approached by rules which allow the state to
redistribute at will across economic lines, but not across religious,
political, or other lines that are subject to higher scrutiny. Therefore,
the very treatment of these cases assumes the constitutionality of
45. 357 U.S. 513 (1958), discussed in Epstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 75-76.
46. 461 U.S. 574 (1983), discussed in Epstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 94-96.
47. 455 U.S. 252 (1982), discussed in Epstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 87-89.
48. 357 U.S. at 529.
49. 461 U.S. at 604.
50. 455 U.S. at 261.
51. 483 U.S. 825 (1987), discussed in Epstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 60-64.
52. 483 U.S. at 834-37.
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schemes that would have been struck down under Lochner, and, a
fortiori, under the analysis of the eminent domain problem that I
offered in my Takings book.5" My analysis of unconstitutional condi-
tions still works after the repudiation of Lochner, but only so long as
some forms of government action are reviewed under a presumption
of distrust.
Once there are strong rights of religion and speech, then it follows,
as the night the day, that the courts must reject the model of ex-
ploitation in talking about contractual and associational rights in
these areas. While it may be allowable today for the legislature to
conclude that the employer exploits the employee in the labor mar-
ket, the state cannot ban or regulate political and religious associa-
tions on the supposed ground that they systematically exploit their
members. Preferred freedoms cannot by stripped away on the care-
free assumption that individuals do not know their own interests
when they join churches, political parties, or community action
groups. Consent has teeth that bite, so we have to address the
greater/lesser problem head on - by use of old techniques that were
originally developed in the economic area but which still survive and
flourish elsewhere. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions will
prove redundant only when all indvidual rights are subject to the
tender mercies of the rational basis test. May that day never come.
53. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 2.

